Author: Staci Nichols – Chief Marketing Rebel

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Retail Giants, New Technology, and Acquisitions: Innovative or Strategic?

According to the “Retail Giants” case study, Walmart and Amazon dominate U.S. retail, together accounting for more than 40% of revenue among the top ten retailers (Langley, Novack, Gibson, & Coyle, 2025). Their scale has made them case study favorites in discussions of supply chain management and retail technology. The case study characterizes Walmart and Amazon as innovators, but that assertion deserves scrutiny.

Not all, but many of the supply chain breakthroughs that Walmart and Amazon are credited with either originated elsewhere, were acquired through buying power, or were significantly refined with outside technology. Instead of pioneering, both companies have in large part built their “share of wallet” by absorbing startups, appropriating competitors’ ideas, and leveraging low-wage labor models to sustain growth (Neuffer, 2025; Economic Policy Institute, 2022; National Employment Law Project, 2023; Greenwald, 2005). This pattern raises the question: are their service initiatives mentioned in the case study truly innovative or more accurately defined as “strategic”?

Walmart’s Internal Technology Advances at Distribution and Fulfillment Centers

Walmart has pursued a wide range of internal technology upgrades, often through partnerships and acquisitions. For example, Walmart’s proprietary machine learning technology, Element, was designed in-house but refined and optimized with external expertise and acquired technology (Dabrinze & Gillin, 2024). Furthermore, in Walmart warehouses, autonomous mobile robots now handle sorting and moving goods (McDade, 2025). Such systems improve productivity but primarily reflect Walmart’s financial capacity to buy automation at scale (Neumark, Zhang, Ciccarella, 2008).

Scholars argue that such strategies illustrate how large retailers often substitute acquisitions and outsourcing for genuine internal innovation (Hitt & Ireland, 1991). These moves, while strategic, primarily reflect breakthroughs developed or refined from outside the company.

Amazon’s Internal Technology Advances at Distribution and Fulfillment Centers

Arguably, Amazon’s most visible recent internal innovation came through acquisition. Amazon’s 2012 purchase of Kiva Systems, later rebranded as Amazon Robotics, introduced mobile robots that retrieve bins and deliver them to workers (Reuters, 2012). More recent developments, such as the Proteus robot, reflect incremental improvements that are rooted in the original acquisition (Amazon, 2022).

Another area where Amazon presents “outsourcing as innovation” is in its delivery model mentioned in the case study (Langley et al., 2025). Instead of building a traditional in-house transportation workforce like UPS or FedEx, Amazon created the Delivery Service Partner (DSP) program. Under this model, drivers wear Amazon uniforms and operate Amazon-branded vans, but they are legally employed by small third-party contractors rather than Amazon itself (USClaims, 2023). Though Amazon presents DSP as a supply chain win–win, labor advocates argue the program shifts employment risks, such as accident liability and uniform costs, onto individual contractors, complicating worker classification and compliance (National Employment Law Project, 2024; Boudreau, 2022). While delivery timeframes decreased, risk-shifting and sidestepping responsibility is more strategic than innovative.

Research shows that Amazon’s growing number of fulfillment centers have yielded a 20% reduction in shipping costs and improved the efficiency of their supply chain. Again, this underscores the scale advantages made possible by enormous capital reserves, not true breakthroughs (Hopp, 2024; Houde et al., 2021). Amazon’s “innovations” are often built on the backs of purchased technologies and absorbed startups rather than revolutionary advancements developed completely in-house. Yes, these efficiencies benefit shareholders and consumers, but “consolidation at scale” is more strategic than innovative.

Walmart’s Progress with Customer-Facing Technology 

Walmart has invested heavily in customer-facing technologies to compete with Amazon’s reputation for convenience. Walmart executives initially stalled in entering the e-commerce space, worrying that expanding online shopping would cannibalize their brick-and-mortar stores (Fortune, 2025). Allowing customers to order online and retrieve their purchase at one of those stores, “Buy Online, Pick Up in Store” (BOPIS) was born. BOPIS, referred to in the case study, is Walmart’s most visible example of advancing customer-facing technology.

Rolled out in 2013, Walmart’s initial BOPIS model was clunky, disorganized, and slow (Souza, 2016). The initiative did include early proprietary concepts, but the BOPIS model applauded today draws heavily on outside acquisitions, partnerships, and startup investments. For example, in 2016, Walmart purchased Jet.com, bringing in digital expertise and leadership that modernized the BOPIS platform (Walmart, 2016). Collaborations with Microsoft, Adobe, and robotics startups supplied the cloud, AI, and automation needed to scale it (Smith, 2024).  In a discussion of supply chain innovations, Walmart’s record shows that their customer-facing advancements are often reactive and largely focus on absorbing talent and technology via their immense buying power.

Amazon’s Progress with Customer-Facing Technology 

Amazon has consistently reshaped customer expectations through external technologies that prioritize speed and personalization. Its Amazon Go stores use sensor fusion, computer vision, and deep learning to allow customers to enter, select products, and pay without physically opening their wallets—they are automatically charged as they exit the store (Amazon, 2021). While the model eliminates lines and cashiers, research highlights that such innovations also shift labor costs and risks away from Amazon, much like their DSP initiative.

Finally, Amazon applies reinforcement learning (RL) to demand forecasting, enabling real-time adjustments in procurement and distribution (Jindal, 2024). Amazon didn’t invent RL—they simply applied it to their massive dataset and logistics network. In other words, what Amazon did was scale existing methods commercially, not pioneer the science. On the surface, these advancements may appear innovative, but they fit the same pattern seen in Amazon’s internal operations: efficiency gains rooted in data acquisition and scale, rather than breakthroughs generated within the company.

Walmart’s Recent Acquisitions and Their Go-to-Market Impact

Reshaping its go-to-market approach, Walmart’s acquisition strategy involves outsourcing and tactical expansion, but it rarely creates new, stand-alone internal innovations. A clear example is its 2025 deal with Symbotic. Walmart sold its Advanced Systems and Robotics unit to Symbiotic for $200 million and simultaneously signed a $520 million agreement for Symbotic to run automation for Walmart at 42 distribution centers (Reuters, 2025). Instead of developing and owning proprietary robotics, Walmart offloaded its research and development burden to Symbotic, who became the brains and owner of the tech.

This calculated move strengthens Walmart’s delivery capacity by scaling automated fulfillment closer to consumers, but it also illustrates how large retailers often substitute external contracts for genuine internal innovation (Hitt & Ireland, 1991). In this case, Walmart expanded its go-to-market strategy not through invention as much as by repackaging their capabilities at scale (Prado, 2021).

Amazon’s Recent Acquisitions and Their Go-to-Market Impact

Likewise, Amazon also expands its go-to-market approach predominantly through buying disruptive technology rather than creating it. For example, the $8.45 billion acquisition of MGM Studios in 2021 strengthened Prime Video’s streaming library with high-profile content like the James Bond franchise (Amazon, 2022). While this expansion helps solidify Amazon as a global retail leader, it’s more strategic than innovative.

Additionally, Amazon’s acquisitions of Ring in 2018 and Blink in 2017 strengthened its position in the smart-home market (Reuters, 2018; Reuters, 2017). Amazon utilized both Ring and Blink technology to siphon additional consumer data into Alexa. It should be noted that Amazon’s Alexa was built in-house but drew heavily on acquired technologies, including the 2013 purchase of Ivona Software, a text-to-speech company that became foundational to Alexa’s capabilities (Reuters, 2013).

Innovative or Strategic?

The “Retail Giants” case study praises Walmart and Amazon for spending billions on new service initiatives when the retail industry has “relatively small margins” (Langley et al., 2025). However, Walmart (2.5-3% margin) and Amazon (10% margin) are hardly comparable to a corner store or mom-and-pop shop with a typical retail margin of 1-2% (Macrotrends, 2025; Macrotrends, 2025; Food Industry Association, 2025). Again, these retail giants rely heavily on labor exploitation and low wages, not innovation, to achieve their higher margins.

Additionally, the case study refers to both Walmart’s BOPIS and Amazon’s outsourced delivery fleet as examples of innovation. Yet the BOPIS model Walmart created on its own was clunky, and Amazon’s DSP initiative lurks in a legal gray area. Reducing delivery times is a tactical move to boost sales, not an industry pioneer like the assembly line or 3-D printing. These mega-retailers are consolidators and appropriators doing what critics call “innovation by acquisition” (Kherzi, 2022). In conclusion, Amazon and Walmart’s service initiatives are far more strategic than innovative.

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